Has Russia Regained the Initiative in Ukraine?
Russia has intensified its operations in Ukraine in recent weeks. In late January, the Russians launched failed attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast in the south and the Vuhledar area in Donetsk Oblast. The Russian forces also continued to attack Bakhmut, a city they have been trying to take since July. The Russians captured Soledar (north east of Bakhmut) by 16 January, and they have been slowly working their way around Bakhmut in the north and south, seeking to cut off the T0504 and E40 motorways. Most recently Russia launched new attacks in the Svatove-Kreminna sector.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on 13 February that these operations probably indicate the start of Russia’s anticipated offensive. It appears that it is commencing incrementally, and will most likely reach its full intensity in the coming weeks. Imagery has emerged of new camps being set up in the Russian Voronezh and Kursk regions, although it is unknown when or where these troops will be deployed. There is no real indication so far that Russia will open new lines of advance, but nothing can be totally ruled out at this stage.
Analysts are debating whether Russia has now regained the initiative, and the debate is neatly summarised in the following twitter exchange.
The answer to this question, and the reason why I think it’s contentious, depends on which level of war you are analysing.
The Operational Initiative
The renewed operations indicate that Russia has regained the initiative at the operational and tactical levels. There has been some, albeit limited, improvement in Russian tactics too. In the Bakhmut sector, the Russians have used elite forces to exploit vulnerable points in the Ukrainian defences, albeit weakened by months of expensive frontal assaults, including by Wagner Group fighters. Elite Russian units have also used urban infiltration tactics here. Western officials are concerned that the Ukrainians are devoting too much effort to defending Bakhmut, expending their ammunition and weakening their forces to the point where they cannot launch a counteroffensive themselves.
However, it is equally true that Russia is already squandering much of its newly-mobilised manpower. Furthermore, outside of the Bakhmut sector, tactical flaws and ineptitude by inadequately trained personnel persist, leading to bloody failures, including in the Vuhledar sector. The UK Ministry of Defence tweeted on 12 February that (based on Ukrainian statistics) the Russians sustained on average 824 casualties per day in the previous week – four times the rate during June-July (if this is accurate).
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) challenged Western officials’ concerns about the Ukrainian defence of Bakhmut by arguing that this attrition will benefit the Ukrainians when they launch their counteroffensive. This is a valid point, and it was certainly the case that Ukraine was able to mount successful counteroffensives in the autumn despite the punishing Donbas battles in the summer. However, reports of ammunition shortages illustrate the sheer challenges Ukraine continues to face in sustaining its war effort.
The Strategic Initiative
As I have indicated in other articles here, the fighting front is only one out of four fronts, and any assessment about who holds the initiative must take into account developments beyond the battlefield. Ukraine has strengthened its position on the diplomatic front and Western nations have agreed to send modern tanks. On the home and resource fronts, according to Ukrainian intelligence, the Kremlin seems reluctant to announce a second mobilisation wave given the administrative problems and societal strain of the first wave.
Nonetheless, there are some developments that will give Ukraine cause for concern. Russo-Iranian co-operation continues to strengthen with an agreement to build a factory in Russia to manufacture at least 6,000 drones. Western states are also publicly dithering over sending fighter jets to Ukraine. Some states, such as the UK, are delaying for sound technical reasons, but it has at least announced it will train Ukrainian pilots. As I argued before, the collective planning and public decision-making process could be better co-ordinated.
Quantity versus Quality
Russia is trying to wrestle the operational initiative away from Ukraine, but it still probably doesn’t have the strategic advantage. As B.A. Friedman argued, the coming stream of Western tanks and equipment should give Ukraine a considerable boost, and Russia is wasting its resources. But Ukraine still needs to absorb these mercilessly relentless attacks and remain capable of offensive operations. It also remains to be seen which side possesses that most precious commodity - time. Careless anonymous briefings from Western officials indicating aid is finite will give Putin the impression that it is on his side. Regardless of whatever is said in private, Western officials and leaders must be always conscious of the signals they are sending to the Kremlin and the world.
After the defeats of 2022, Putin has been forced into conducting a military experiment: can mass provide a substitute for quality in 21st century industrial warfare? We will come closer to finding out the answer over the next few months.