Think Tanks for Ukraine
Over the past week, a number of Western nations announced their intention to supply Main Battle Tanks to Ukraine. Among the key contributors include the UK, which pledged 14 Challenger 2 tanks, and Poland, which will provide 14 Leopard 2 tanks and 60 PT-91 tanks. Germany eventually announced it will send 14 Leopard 2 tanks, while the US will donate 31 M1 Abrams tanks.
The Ukrainian Need for Tanks
There are compelling reasons as to why Ukraine needs these tanks. Firstly, the last few months have shown that the war is far from over, and Ukraine will need a continual stream of weapon systems for the foreseeable future. Since the Ukrainian liberation of Kherson City in November, the operational tempo has slowed and advances by both sides have been small, sluggish, and bloody. The Ukrainians have been advancing steadily towards Svatove and Kreminna. In Donetsk Oblast, the Russians have made small, costly advances, especially in the Bakhmut area, and they recently captured the salt mine city of Soledar. Russian forces have also undertaken new offensive activity in the Vuhledar area and Zaporizhia Oblast, probably attacks aimed at diverting Ukrainian forces away from the Svatove-Kreminna Line. Although the Russians are still on the strategic back foot, they are trying to regain some operational initiative.
Secondly, as Russia is expected to launch a spring offensive, tanks and armoured vehicles will provide the Ukrainian forces with the mobility to respond to attacks with force. Thirdly, Ukraine is looking to launch a counteroffensive of its own and for that tanks are essential. Tanks enable forces to break through enemy defensive lines and advance rapidly, as was illustrated by Ukraine’s Kharkiv counteroffensive in September.
This is not to say that tanks are a magic pill, however. The earlier Russian offensives have highlighted some of their vulnerabilities, especially in the face of drones, contemporary firepower, and effective anti-tank tactics. Nonetheless, employed effectively under the right conditions in co-ordination with the other elements of the combined arms machine (other armoured vehicles, infantry, artillery, etc), and not forgetting that the Ukrainians will possess advanced Western models, the tanks should provide them with the best chance of restoring some kind of mobility to the battlefield. However, this won’t happen overnight as the delivery of and training for these tanks will take months.
A Victory on the Diplomatic Front?
Whatever operational advantages Ukraine will gain from its new tanks, there is a risk that this could be diminished by Western public diplomatic uncertainty. Although the West eventually displayed a united front, the problem was the ‘eventually’ part of that. The public hesitation of Olaf Scholz especially, and the initial lack of a final announcement at the Ukraine Defence Contact Group meeting at Ramstein Air Base on 20 January risked sending a signal to Putin that Western resolve has the potential to crack.
To avoid that, democratic governments will need to allay any growing public concerns and maintain diplomatic unity. They must continually make the case for supporting the country and treat defence with the importance the situation demands. There also has to be better co-ordination and forward planning. Ukrainian requests should be anticipated, and any issues among Western governments should be resolved before decisions are required.
However, for now it seems that the same torturous process will be repeated as Ukraine turns its attention to obtaining Western-made fighter jets. As I outlined in my last piece, this war is being fought on four interrelated fronts – the fighting, resource, home, and diplomatic fronts. Ukraine’s resources, its combat effectiveness, and its morale is now, to a greater extent, reliant on Western support. Ukraine’s future success therefore in part depends on more coherent thinking from its supporters about that last front.