The Russo-Ukrainian War at the End of 2022
The second half of 2022 witnessed important developments in the Russo-Ukrainian War. In the summer, the Ukrainians used longer range Western-made artillery, including US-manufactured HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems), to degrade Russian logistics in the south, and they started to make advances in the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast border area. To deal with this threat, Russia began to divert forces from the Kharkiv sector (in the east) to the south. Then, on 6 September, Ukraine launched its counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region, and quickly captured a number of settlements including Izyum, Kupyansk, and in October, Lyman. This forced a Russian withdrawal from most of occupied territory in the Kharkiv region. Meanwhile in north-western Kherson Oblast, the Ukrainians continued to make advances during October and November. With their backs against the Dnipro River, the Russians evacuated Kherson city (the only provincial capital they captured earlier in the war) and the west bank of the river in early November.
The operational tempo has slowed since the onset of autumn, partly due to the wet weather and mud. Nonetheless, fierce fighting has still taken place across the length of the front, with the Donbas experiencing some of the most intense battles. The Russians have been throwing unit after unit at Bakhmut and around the Avdiivka-Donetsk city and Vuhledar areas, among other places, for little gain. The Ukrainians have been moving forward in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast sector, approaching Svatove and Kreminna.
The Russian Situation
Russia ends the year in a poor place. It has been humiliated on the world stage by what it considers to be an inferior enemy. Putin started the campaign in February seeking to showcase Russia’s military might; yet he ended up exposing to the world his forces’ deep-rooted weaknesses. Despite this, Putin is continuing his war, and his plan for the next phase rests on three key elements.
Firstly, Russia has called-up 300,000 personnel during its autumn partial mobilisation, albeit in an extremely disorganised fashion. Putin seems to be placing faith in the notion that ‘quantity has a quality of its own’, and that Russian numbers would be able to buy him some time as well as inflict losses on the Ukrainian forces. Mass may make a difference in some circumstances, but in Ukraine this is offset by a combination of Ukrainian Western-manufactured firepower, Ukrainian tactical competence, and the poor quality of the Russian forces. The mobilised personnel reinforcing the front have received minimal training, and there is considerable evidence indicating that many are poorly motivated, inadequately equipped, and are badly led by a divided command structure and culture. The Russians are also running their equipment and ammunition stockpiles down. Artillery munition supply problems have reportedly affected Russian operations in the Avdiivka area.
There has been some media speculation that Russia might launch a winter or spring offensive which could involve another invasion in northern Ukraine from Belarus. This could involve a more limited operation than in February-March 2022, this time aiming to draw some Ukrainian forces away from the south and east. However, the Russians themselves would also be dividing their combat power again, and they risk another embarrassing defeat if this grouping is not resilient in the face of Ukrainian firepower.
The second element is the strategic air campaign against Ukrainian energy and other civilian infrastructure. Putin is hoping this will demoralise the civilian population, who would then pressurise Zelensky into making peace. The problem with this is that Russia is firing missiles at a faster rate than it can replace, and the Ukrainians are getting better at shooting down missiles and drones. The deployment of US-manufactured Patriot missiles will enhance Ukraine’s air defence further. It remains to be seen whether a sustained campaign would severely impact civilian morale, but national survival is a powerful motivator for Ukrainians, and the Ukrainian population has already adapted to nearly a year of ‘people’s war’.
The third component is external military aid, the delivery of which would help alleviate Russia’s equipment and supply problems. Russia has received and used drones from Iran, and the US also believes that North Korea is covertly supplying ammunition. How long this can be sustained, or whether Iran will also supply missiles is uncertain, especially given Iran’s own political and economic problems.
The Ukrainian Situation
The recent counteroffensives illustrate that the Ukrainians can pull off successful, sophisticated offensive operations. The Ukrainians have shown they are highly capable, adaptable, and imaginative. They have displayed an operational subtlety and finesse that the Russians have simply lacked. Nonetheless, despite this success, the Ukrainians still face immediate-term risks and challenges going into 2023.
Firstly, the Ukrainians will have to find ways to maintain the strategic initiative and operational tempo. This is not so simple, as any fighting military needs periods to regroup and refit. Ukraine will also need to be militarily and morally resilient in the face of the continual stream of Russian reinforcements, further Russian attacks, and any potential Russian adaptation. Secondly, Ukrainian civilians will need to be morally resilient in the face of the attacks on its energy infrastructure, as well as continuing to cope with the strains of 21st century industrial warfare.
Thirdly, given how crucial Western equipment has been in facilitating Ukrainian success, Zelensky will still need to ensure the continuation of Western aid. Western resolve will be tested as European energy demand and prices rise throughout the winter. In addition, concerns over decreasing Western equipment stockpiles may constrain how much Western nations can send in the future. While Western leaders still maintain that they are in it for the long haul, Putin will hope that political pressures will lead to reduced Western support.
The Four Front War
At this stage, Ukraine certainly has the strategic initiative, but how the long the war will last is difficult to predict. Taking back the full extent of occupied Ukraine will still not be easy. For the foreseeable future, the fierce, bitter struggle will continue.
Although military technique is extremely important, the war will also be determined by factors beyond the battlefield. This conflict is being fought on four fronts – (1) the fighting front, (2) the resource front, (3) the home front, and (4) the diplomatic front.1 Success, whether defined as a decisive victory (for Ukraine, this would be the retaking of all occupied territory) or having a strong negotiating hand in any peace talks, will ultimately depend on obtaining a significant advantage on all four fronts. For now, the biggest question mark for Ukraine is the diplomatic front, which ultimately determines the resources it can deploy. It is ultimately up to the West to ensure that Ukraine maintains the advantage here.
I am drawing inspiration from and adapting William Philpott’s five front framework for analysing First World War grand strategy. See William Philpott, War of Attrition: Fighting the First World War (London: Little, Brown, 2014), 6-10.