The Battle of Severodonetsk: A Very Early Assessment
On 25 June, the Russians took full control of Severodonetsk, a city with a pre-war population of around 100,000. The Governor of Luhansk Oblast Serhiy Haidai has stated that over 90% of houses were shelled and 80% of them were severely damaged by the end of the campaign. This short piece will address how the Russians seized Severodonetsk, and what the battle tells us about the state of the Russian and Ukrainian forces.
The Battle of Severodonetsk
Prior to the main ground attack, the Russians had been conducting artillery and air strikes on the city and surrounded it on three sides. On 27 May, the Russians began their direct ground assault. Since the earlier ‘breakout’ from Popasna had now slowed down, they ultimately began this battle without encircling the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk vicinity on the fourth, western side first. Nonetheless, the Russians initially advanced through the city relatively speedily. The Chechen Kadyrovites captured the Mir hotel in the north, and the Russians advanced deeper into the city, occupying most of it. On 5 June, the Ukrainians (including reinforcements from the International Foreign Legion) counterattacked and regained up to half of the city. However, the Russians responded with more attacks, and pushed the Ukrainians back to their previous positions a day later.
By 8-9 June, the fighting centred on the Azot chemical plant. Furthermore, by 13 June, all four bridges on the Siverskyi Donets River, which divides Severodonetsk from Lysychansk, had been destroyed or rendered unusable. On 24 June, Haidai announced that the Ukrainians were making a withdrawal from the city, and the next day, the Mayor of Severodonetsk, Oleksandr Stryuk, confirmed that the Russians had now fully occupied the city.
Meanwhile, the Russians have been setting up their next battles. The Russian force advancing from Popasna captured a number of settlements on 21 June, and was approaching the southern outskirts of Lysychansk by 23 June. The Russians are also in the process of encircling Hirske and Zolote to the northeast of Popasna.
Explaining the Battle
The battle has illustrated some improvements in the Russian conduct of this war. In my previous article on the Popasna ‘breakout’ in mid-to-late May, I suggested there were three broad reasons for the Russian success at that point: concentration of Russian firepower, improvements in Russian combined arms tactics, and factors concerning the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). The Severodonetsk battle provides us with some more clues on how these factors are influencing the Donbas campaign.
Concentration of Russian Firepower
The most important factor is still Russia’s concentration of forces and firepower in a small area. In the Donbas campaign, the Russians have been able to play to their strengths and apply their doctrine. They have used artillery and airpower to devastate Severodonetsk, inflict casualties, and then advance. Moreover, the Russians were able to leverage a considerable quantitative advantage in firepower, and reportedly outnumbered the Ukrainians in artillery pieces by 10-15 to 1. This was always going to be an overwhelming challenge for the Ukrainians.
Russian Combined-Arms Improvements
The campaign also indicated that there have been some more improvements in Russian combined arms warfare and tactics. This includes its use of airpower and co-ordination of air and artillery fires. Russia has also regained its effectiveness in electronic warfare, and its concentration of air defence systems in the Donbas appears to have curtailed Ukrainian air sorties and neutralised Bayraktar drones there – a key source of Russian frustration in the early phase of the war.
Ukrainian Challenges
We now have some more information on how the Ukrainians are faring. On the one hand, this battle has shown that Ukraine continues to put up a spirited and well-organised defence. It employed a flexible defence, which involved sending in reinforcements, attacking the Russians at opportune moments, inflicting losses, and then withdrawing. However, this has still come at a cost. They have been losing 100-200 personnel per day, suffered 30-50% losses in equipment, and their stocks of Soviet-era artillery ammunition are dwindling. This has led to requests for more Western long-range tube and rocket artillery. Three months of intense fighting, plus the bloody nature of the Donbas battles have degraded Ukraine’s combat power to some extent, and the Russians have been able to take advantage of this.
Russian Difficulties and Future Challenges
Nevertheless, the campaign also highlighted Russian weaknesses. Firstly, at the strategic level, Russia has invested a considerable amount of force and blood to capture a relatively small city with some political value (it was the administrative centre of Luhansk Oblast post-2014), but limited strategic value.
Secondly, at the operational level, due to their manpower constraints, attrition, and the fact they have been conducting simultaneous attacks in the Donbas theatre in nine directions, the Russians haven’t had the reserves at hand to exploit local tactical successes. This has led to slow advances, as well as their failure to synchronise the attack on Severodonetsk with an encirclement of Lysychansk, enabling the Ukrainians to conduct its organised withdrawal from the former. Thirdly, at the tactical level, Russian military analysts have reported that Russian forces have had difficulties locating and neutralising Ukrainian artillery due to a lack of radar and drones.
Despite the additional information we now have from Severodonetsk and other battles in this period, the next phase of the Donbas campaign is still very difficult to predict. It may depend on three critical factors. Firstly, terrain. Lysychansk sits on higher ground, and this will aid the Ukrainians should they make a significant stand there. Secondly, the nature of the Ukrainian resistance. Severodonetsk was not the Ukrainian’s main stand in the Donbas, and it remains to be seen whether things will change once they make that stand. Deciding where it should take place is a key decision in itself, but it will most likely be in Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. We also need to see how much of a difference the influx of heavy Western-produced weaponry will make. On paper, they should help counter Russian artillery, and, as we are beginning to see, help strike Russian logistics and command posts deep behind enemy lines. But are there enough of them to make a wider impact?
Thirdly, while the Russians have the firepower advantage (at least until Western-manufactured artillery in sizeable numbers arrive), question marks remain over their capacity to keep mounting offensives at this tempo. There are continued reports of high casualties, and some Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) being reduced to as little as 10-15 personnel. Recruits are also reportedly receiving minimal training before being sent to the most intense areas. The recent Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Kherson region, combined with partisan activity in occupied territories, highlight key vulnerabilities that the Russians will have to devote some attention to dealing with. It is difficult to see how Russia can continue without some kind of operational pause, although it is worth noting that analysts have been saying this for a while, and yet the Russian attacks keep coming.
Given that both sides possess key vulnerabilities, varying operational environments, and the capacity for both sides to learn, it’s still too early to say whether Russia has discovered a formula in Severodonetsk it could successfully replicate elsewhere, or whether its campaign will eventually falter. The twists and turns of the past month or so serves as another reminder as to why Carl von Clausewitz placed so much emphasis on chance, friction, and uncertainty in his theory of war. It is important to remember this as we continue to speculate on the future.