NATO's Capabilities, Will, and the Madrid Summit
NATO leaders are meeting during 28-30 June 2022 in Madrid for a historic summit – the first since Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine. NATO has demonstrated a show of unity against Russia and has made a series of announcements. These include the publication of a new Strategic Concept which designated Russia and China as key threats (the former being the ‘most significant and direct threat’), an increase in the NATO Response Force from 40,000 to 300,000, and an increase in the battlegroups in eastern Europe to brigade-sized forces. The latter shifts NATO strategy in the Baltics from a ‘tripwire’, reactive strategy to more of a ‘forward presence’ strategy like that during the First Cold War. The US also announced plans to establish permanent army headquarters in Poland.
The new Strategic Concept is a far cry from the naivety of the 2010 Strategic Concept, which, despite Russia’s invasion of Georgia two years earlier, stated that ‘we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined’, and NATO still sought to ‘enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests’. Nonetheless, despite the strong words and change in approach this time, there are still disconnects, contradictions, and vulnerabilities beneath the surface that NATO members need to address. I have identified three of them: psychological preparedness, policy, and unity.
Psychological Preparedness
The first key question is whether the increase in rhetoric and forces are matched by the same level of psychological preparedness for a Cold War among Euro-Atlantic publics. Evidence since 24 February is mixed. In the UK and US at least, media coverage was dominated by Ukraine in the first month of the war. Yet political and media interest has been waning since then, and politics reverted to its post-2016 ‘business as usual’. Bitter internal divisions resurfaced. Americans are currently embroiled in a fierce political and legal row over abortion rights. In the UK, Boris Johnson is under pressure to resign, there is set to be a summer of strikes, and the SNP’s announcement to hold a Scottish independence referendum next year will serve as a major internal distraction at the worst possible moment.
Moreover, until the summit, there had been no real levelling with publics from political classes, at least in the Western Euro-Atlantic area, over the sacrifices that need to be made for this Cold War, and this may affect the implementation of NATO’s new announcements. For example, it is very difficult to see how the Response Force can be increased to 300,000 if some of its key members are not prioritising European security or the armed forces in their public debates. To be fair, there has been far more discussion on defence spending in the UK this week. Whether politicians and journalists can maintain this interest remains to be seen.
Policy
This leads to the question of whether domestic defence policies are facilitating the delivery of NATO’s objectives. NATO states are increasing their defence budgets. For example, the German decision to increase defence spending by €100 billion earlier in the year is a major step forward, albeit from a low base. However, although the UK is spending just above the NATO 2% of GDP minimum target, plenty of defence analysts and former service chiefs question whether this is enough. Johnson has been rightly vocal about Russian atrocities, and even said: ‘we also need to make sure that we think about the lessons of the last few months’. However, there has not been a major rethink of the government’s 2021 Integrated Review, and whether, for example, reducing the regular army to 72,000 at this time is sensible. NATO as a whole also needs to ask itself whether the 2% minimum target itself is outdated.
[Update: On 30 June, Johnson announced that British defence spending will increase to 2.5% of GDP by 2030, and has asked Jens Stoltenberg to make 2.5% a NATO-wide minimum target. This is a step in the right direction, but it still does not reflect the urgency of the current situation. It also remains to be seen whether this will lead to Johnson re-opening specific measures in the Integrated Review].
Unity
Questions also remain about differences among NATO members. Although Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz vowed to keep supporting Ukraine’s right to fight on for as long as necessary; it is unlikely, however, that the former especially has abandoned his desire to arbitrate over some kind of settlement. Questions also remain over how co-operative states like Hungary will be. One additional point is how member states will approach relations with Communist China given the strong wording in the Strategic Concept. Will members continue to prioritise trade, or will the SC finally lead to firmer approaches?
Conclusion
The Madrid summit represents a significant moment in NATO’s history, and it signifies a new level of seriousness in the West’s approach to its security. Nonetheless, the weaknesses above are potential barriers to the implementation of this week’s agenda. A classic formula for deterrence is: deterrence = capability x will. NATO is allocating more capabilities for the defence of its eastern flank. The Alliance needs to ensure the ‘will’ side of the equation is upheld too.