Have the Russians Made a Breakthrough in the Donbas?
Assessing the Popasna 'Breakout' and the Capture of Lyman
The Russo-Ukrainian War has already provided us with striking examples of how unpredictable war can be, and how wars can contain various twists and turns. The current campaign in the Donbas is no exception. Only a couple of weeks ago, Russia’s Donbas campaign was stumbling, and Russia was reeling from a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region. Yet over the past week or so, Russia has gained some momentum.
The Donbas Campaign So Far
Having retreated from northern Ukraine, the Russians indicated in late-March that they would, at least in the short-term, scale down their objectives, and focus on defeating Ukrainian forces in the Donbas region (Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts). It was generally understood by Western analysts that Russia intended to encircle the Ukrainian forces situated in the salient there. However, others have argued that the real plan was a substantial advance that aimed to divide them.
Regardless of the details, the plan was still too ambitious, and the attempted Russian drives from Izyum towards Barvinkove and Slovyansk faltered (the Russians continue to conduct largely unsuccessful attacks towards Slovyansk to this day). Any drive from the south was compromised by the Russian need to finish off the battle for Mariupol and capture the Azovstal steel plant. In the northeastern and eastern part of the salient, the Russians made slow, but steady progress. It took them six weeks to finally take Popasna on 7 May, a town with a pre-war population of around 20,000. It became apparent that there would be no sweeping Russian advances across the Donbas countryside.
After the failure of this broader operation and a Ukrainian counteroffensive which pushed the Russians back in northern Kharkiv Oblast, the Russians limited its focus even further, and reverted to their 2014 strategy of smaller encirclements. The Russians’ focal point would be the encirclement of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, two cities in the northeastern part of the salient, sitting aside the Siverskyi Donets River, and each with a pre-war population of around 100,000. Around 20 May, the Russians ‘broke out’ of Popasna. They are now principally advancing to the north in an attempt to complete the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk encirclement (which they still haven’t achieved), as well as westwards towards the city of Bakhmut. There is also fighting to the east of Popasna. Moreover, a key Russian objective is to cut off the two main motorways running into Lysychansk. Meanwhile, other Russian forces have managed to surround Severodonetsk from the east, north, and south, and have already entered the city even though it has still not been encircled from the west.
The Russians also made other gains. By 24 May, they captured Svitlodarsk, southwest of Popasna. The Russians also captured Lyman, northeast of Slovyansk, by 27-28 May, a key rail hub. In addition, they have conducted attacks around Avdiivka in the southern part of the salient.
The Reasons for Russia’s Success
Analysts have given various explanations for the Russian success, and I think they can be grouped into three main categories. The first category concerns Russian improvements at the operational level which has created more favourable tactical circumstances. The Russians have concentrated their forces more effectively while limiting their objectives. They are also operating along shorter lines of communications and are taking advantage of the Luhansk rail system. The capture of the high ground around Popasna also gave the Russians a considerable advantage in terms of observation and use of artillery.
Secondly, the Russians may have improved at the tactical level, although it seems that they are simply employing their traditional brute force tactics more effectively. This involves using artillery and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) to smash the enemy’s defences before advancing with infantry, tanks, and armoured vehicles. There are also reports of increasing air support.
The third category concerns the Ukrainian armed forces. It’s tricky to assess this because even now Ukraine has, on the whole, been effective at not revealing its true state, casualty levels, and weaknesses. This is understandably necessary for maintaining national morale. Nevertheless, it would be reasonable to infer that defending the country at such an intense level over three months has taken some toll materially and emotionally. Ukraine’s call for long-range MLRS illustrates that it is still facing substantial challenges.
No doubt analysts and historians will debate which of these categories are more important. Russian tactical weaknesses can be more easily masked when operating in more favourable circumstances. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) puts more weight on the concentration of effort, and it’s important to note that pro-Russian military bloggers such as Alexander Sladkov still criticise the lack of Russian tactical cohesion. Therefore, we need to see the Russian armed forces operate under less favourable conditions before we can make firmer conclusions about how far they’ve improved tactically.
A Russian Breakthrough?
Despite recent Russian successes, it is important to place them into context and perspective. The Russian advances are slow and gradual. The Lyman-Severdonetsk-Popasna sector is one small sector in the wider Donbas region, which itself is only one part of Ukraine. Unlike what Russian bots would have you believe, we are not talking rapid advances across whole swathes of the country or Russians taking major cities here. Of course, this is not to diminish the real suffering currently being experienced by civilians caught up in the salient.
There are also Russian weaknesses at the strategic and operational levels. The effort they are devoting to Severodonetsk-Lysychansk far outweighs their strategic significance. The Russians are also starting the battle of Severodonetsk before they have fully encircled the city from the west, giving the Ukrainians the opportunity to either escape or reinforce nearby. It may also indicate that the advance from Popasna is not going as quickly as Russian commanders would like.
This in turn prompts questions about whether Russian can maintain the momentum. Severodonetsk is only the first major urban operation Russia will have to undertake in this campaign. Even if Severodonetsk is taken quickly due to a Ukrainian retreat, other cities may be defended more stiffly. We have already seen how such operations drain resources and result in considerable casualties. Costly sieges might also exacerbate Russia’s already considerable manpower problems.
Lastly, there is the question of how Ukraine will react. On 28 May, Ukraine mounted offensive operations in the Kherson region (in southern Ukraine). How this will affect the campaign in the Donbas, if at all, remains to be seen. The danger for the Russians in concentrating in the Donbas is that they potentially leave their flanks vulnerable.
Nevertheless, this current campaign is a reminder that war is unpredictable, that war usually involves adaptation on both sides, and that this war probably has some way to go. It’s also a reminder that Ukraine still needs continued Western support and weapons.
This article expands upon and updates my YouTube video from earlier in the week.